Initial Public Offering or Initial Private Placement? by Fjesme, Sturla Lyngnes & Norli, Øyvind
 Working Paper  
No. 4/2011 
  
April 2011  
Initial Public Offering or  
Initial Private Placement? 
Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme and Øyvind Norli  
© Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme and Øyvind Norli  2011. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to 
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, provided that full credit, including © 
notice, is given to the source. This paper can be downloaded without charge from the CCGR website 
http://www.bi.no/ccgr 
1Initial Public O¤ering or Initial Private Placement?
.
Sturla Lyngnes Fjesme1
The Norwegian Business School (BI)
Øyvind Norli
The Norwegian Business School (BI)
April 11, 2010
Abstract
This paper studies the choice between an auction and a negotiation when sell-
ing a large fraction of a company. Using detailed data on ownership structure in
123 public o¤erings and 88 negotiated private placements, we show that negoti-
ated private placements are much more common when there are signicant private
benets of control. This nding supports the idea that a negotiated transaction
allow the seller to extract more of the gains from trade when the gains from trade
include private benets.
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21. Introduction
Stock exchanges have stringent rules on minimum equity levels and the minimum number
of shareholders that are required to list publicly. Most private companies must issue equity to
be able to meet these minimum requirements. Shares can either be sold in a public o¤ering to
a large group of dispersed investors or in a private placement to a small group of specialized
investors. Most theoretical papers on equity o¤erings show that public o¤erings will almost
always be preferred by the seller, so why some companies use private placements has been
the focus of many empirical studies in nance. The research question addressed in this paper
is whether private placements are used to transfer private benets of control from the buyer
to the seller. The new and unique data in this paper includes investor level ownership on 88
private placements and 123 public o¤erings during their listing on the Oslo Stock Exchange
(OSE) in the period 1993 to 2007. Investor level ownership records and audited nancial
statements of all companies before and after the listings are used to identify private benets
of control.
The main contribution of the paper is that we show a strong and robust relationship
between private benets of control before the o¤ering and the use of private placements2.
This suggests that sellers use private placements to transfer private benets of control to the
buyers. Private placements are used by family rms and rms with controlling owners before
the o¤erings. Public o¤erings are used by companies with more dispersed ownership before
2The agency problem investigated is between large owners and small owners. Large owners have a con-
trolling benet at small owners expense. Throughout the article, we mean the private benet of controlling
the rm enjoyed by the controlling/big shareholders at the expense of smaller owners when the term private
benet of control is used. Other agency problems, that we do not study, can for instance be between owners
and managers in the rm.
3the o¤erings. Companies that use private placements also have more block ownership after
the listing. Public o¤erings reduce block ownership. The main implication of this nding is
that companies with low private benets of control should be sold in public o¤erings, and
companies with high private benets of control should be sold in private placements. The
nding also have implications for research on auctions and negotiations. When auctions are
structured like public o¤erings and there is a large private benet of control, the seller is
likely to prefer a negotiation over an auction.
Several papers have proposed explanations to the private placement choice made by some
companies. Some papers argue that private placements are used to attract value creating
investors such as monitoring or certication investors (Wruck, 1989; Hertzel and Smith,
1993). These investors ensure that companies are run optimal or put their stamp of ap-
proval on company valuations. Other papers suggests that private placements are used when
buyers value private benets of control (Zingales, 1995; Zingales, 1994; Zwiebel, 1995 and
Damodaran, 2005). Most existing research on private equity o¤erings are on publicly listed
companies. These are then studies of Seasoned Equity O¤erings (SEOs). The reason for
this is likely to be that there are more available data on publicly listed companies. Only
investigating public companies is problematic for this research question because this leaves
out the major equity o¤erings taken place before the actual listing. The new Norwegian data
does not have this problem. Many of the companies that list on the OSE through private
placements have follow-on public and employee o¤erings before the listing. This shows that
private placements must often be used in connection with a follow-on o¤ering to meet list-
ing requirements. This also show that the private or public choice is not dictated by the
minimum size listing requirements.
4Derrien and Kecskés (2007) show that many U.K. companies lists publicly without issuing
equity and that these companies issue equity in a SEO after the listing. This two stage listing
is cheaper than the normal IPO. On the OSE there are only a limited number of companies
that are allowed to use this two stage process. In most listings on the OSE the o¤ering is a
requirement to list. The choice faced by most companies is not if there should be an o¤ering
before or after the listing. The choice is if the required o¤ering should be public, private or
to existing shareholders. Few companies have an existing shareholder base that can cover
the o¤ering in full. Listing rules require that there must be at least 500 owners to list on the
main list of the OSE (100 at the Small and Medium Sized SMB/Axess list). Only 21 out of
403 companies have listings with only an o¤er to existing shareholders. Therefore, the main
choice at the OSE is between a private placement and a public o¤ering. This makes the OSE
an ideal market to study the choice between public o¤erings and private placements.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related literature. Section
3 describes the road to the listing. Section 4 describes predictions and testable implications.
Section 5 and 6 describes the data set and the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review
All papers are summarized in Table 1. There are many theoretical papers that study
equity sales. Bulow and Klemperer (1996, 2009) compare auctions to negotiations and se-
quential sales mechanisms.3 Bulow and Klemperer (1996) show that for a seller it is better
to sell in an auction with (N+1) bidders than in a negotiation with N bidders. The seller
3IPOs are not really open auctions, and private placements are not really negotiations in the exact same
sense as used in all of the literature. There are, however, large similarities between IPOs and auctions
and private placements and negotiations, and we therefore include a literature review on the auctions and
negotiations literature. We also expect that our ndings may have implications for research on auctions.
5should focus on maximizing the number of bidders and not focus on nding a single bidder to
negotiate with. The exception to this rule is when more information must be disclosed in the
auction. When more information (that can possible reduce the future asset value for the nal
owner) is disclosed in the auction it is possible that the negotiation is more protable for the
seller than the auction. Bulow and Klemperer (2009) show that buyers (usually) prefer to
buy in a sequential sale (negotiation), and sellers (usually) prefer to sell in an auction. The
exception to this nding is when the marginal revenue curve of the winner is very at, there
are many potential bidders and the bidder cost of obtaining value information is neither too
high nor to low. French and McCormick (1984) nd that negotiations should be used instead
of auctions when there is an ongoing relationship between bidder and seller, there is a low
asset value di¤erence between bidder and seller, there is a low asset value di¤erence between
di¤erent bidders and the actual negotiation cost is low compared to auctions.
Zingales (1995) propose that the buyer of a company can have a higher company value
than the current owner from either an increase in the private benets of control or an increase
in the cash ow. By selling to dispersed shareholders the proceeds from the sale of cash ow
rights are maximized. Through bargaining with a buyer, the seller maximizes proceeds from
the sale of control rights. Zingales (1994) argue that one of the most common areas of private
benets of control is dilution of minority property rights. This also shows that there should
be some smaller investors in the companies that use private placements. It is also argued that
control is more valuable during proxy contests. Damodaran (2005) argues that the value of a
block of shares comes from the ability to inuence control by changing the way the business is
currently run. Damodaran (2005) argues that block shares are sold at a premium compared
to dispersed shares. Value of control can be calculated as the value of the rm assuming
6that it is optimally run minus the status quo value of the rm. Control of a rm does not
necessarily require 51% of shares if the remaining shares are sold to a dispersed group of
shareholders. Zwiebel (1995) investigates smaller block shares. It is argued that there are
benets of having blocks that are smaller than controlling stakes from partial benets of
control. Smaller block holders can join together and get control if desired. Private benets
of control can be the ability of owners, management or directors to dilute corporate funds for
private benets.4 Private benets can also be synergies obtainable through mergers (during
takeover contests opposing sides actively recruit block shareholders), favors by rms, access
to inside information, perquisites of control and utility derived directly from power of control.
Some rms, such as sports and communication rms, are likely to yield private benets from
the nature of their business. Stoughton and Zechner (1998) argue that IPOs are allocated to
institutions to increase monitoring.
Many empirical papers also propose explanations to equity sales. Wruck (1989), later
referred to as the monitoring hypothesis, show that active investors buy shares privately and
monitor management. It is argued that monitoring will increase value by ensuring e¢ ciency
and openness to value creating takeovers. The article investigates 128 private placements
made by companies listed on NYSE and AMEX in the period 1979 to 1985. Hertzel and Smith
(1993), later referred to as the certication hypotheses, argues that an informed investor buy
large blocks of shares in private placements to put their stamp of approval on rm valuation.
The paper investigates 106 private placements made by smaller companies listed on NASDAQ
in the period 1980 to 1987. It is concluded that certication is a likely reason behind private
4In this paper we study private benets of control enjoyed by big owners through dilution of corporate
funds.
7placements. Barclay et al. (2007) investigate if monitoring (Wruck, 1989) and certication
(Hertzel and Smith, 1993) explains private placements by investigating 594 U.S. publicly
traded rms in the period 1979 to 1997. Their main ndings is that private placements are
often allocated to passive investors that help management keep control of the company. This
is proposed as the entrenchment hypothesis, and it is concluded that entrenchment is a more
likely reason for private placements than monitoring or certication.
Anshuman et al. (2010) propose the undervaluation hypothesis as appose to the mon-
itoring, certication and entrenchment hypotheses. The undervaluation hypothesis is an
extension of Myers and Majluf (1984), and the hypothesis propose that company manage-
ment and insiders buy shares in their own company, through private placements, when they
believe that the company is undervalued. The hypothesis is tested on a sample of 164 private
placements in the Indian capital market in the period 2001 to 2009. It is concluded that
private placements (to company insiders) can eliminate underinvestment, and the underin-
vestment hypothesis can explain the private placement choice after controlling for monitor-
ing, certication and entrenchment. Wu (2003) investigates how information asymmetry and
monitoring a¤ects the company choice between public o¤erings and private placements. The
data investigated is 728 public o¤erings and 360 private placements made by high technology
companies that have recently been publicly listed on NYSE, Nasdaq or AMEX. The main
ndings are that private placement companies have a higher information asymmetry than
public o¤ering companies, and private placement investors do not monitor more than public
o¤erings investors.
Wu (2003) concludes that monitoring is not a likely reason behind private placements.
Brennan and Franks (1997) investigate 67 U.K. IPOs and nd that underpricing is used to
8ensure su¢ cient oversubscription and rationing of shares. This is done by IPO company
insiders to discriminate between shareholders and reduce block sizes. Brennan and Franks
(1997) argues that underpricing is used to avoid block holder formations. Aru¼gaslan, Cook
and Kieschnick (2004) investigate 3,441 U.S. IPOs and nd that determinants of initial
returns, institutional share holdings and post- IPO likelihood of acquisition are not consistent
with either Brennan and Franks (1997) or Stoughton and Zechner (1998). Aru¼gaslan et
al. (2004) concludes that monitoring considerations are not important determinants of IPO
underpricing. Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) investigate how companies choose between rights
o¤erings and private placements in SEOs. The sample is Swedish publicly traded companies
in the period 1986 to 1999. It is found that companies with much asymmetric information will
choose private placements over rights o¤erings. Companies will choose private placements
to current shareholders when asymmetric information is extreme. Private placements can be
used to reduce moral hazard and adverse selection costs and o¤set high issue cost. Companies
also do private placements to new business partners.
Boone and Mulherin (2007) investigate why not all rms are sold in competitive auctions.
The data includes 202 auctioned and 198 negotiated takeovers of U.S. public rms in the
period 1989 to 1999. The main nding is that there is no di¤erence in wealth e¤ects of the
target rms after a negotiation and an auction. The auction does not increase revenue for the
seller. Boone and Mulherin (2008) investigate 145 auctioned and 163 negotiated takeovers by
U.S. publicly traded bidders in the period 1989 to 1999. The paper test if the return to the
winning bidder is related to the level of competition in the takeover market. It is assumed
that there is a negative relationship between the number of bidders and the level of value
uncertainty and the bidder return if the winners curse is true. The paper nds that there
9is no relationship between bidder returns and competition. It is concluded that there is no
winners curse in the corporate takeover market.
3. The road to the listing
The listing process includes many formal requirements. These are dictated changes the
company must make to be allowed to list publicly. The private company must also make
many decisions that are not formal requirements. The most notable, for this article, is if
shares should be sold in a public o¤ering or a private placement.
3.1 The formal listing process
The listing process takes between eight and 14 weeks to complete after it has been decided
to take a private company public.5 The private company must rst select an investment bank.
When the terms are agreed, the listing process is initiated. The company and the investment
bank have a meeting with the board of the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) to initiate the process.
The investment bank hire an accounting rm and a law rm to complete a nancial and a
legal due diligence of the private company. The investment bank then (assuming everything
is in order) makes a compliance report that shows that the private company meet all formal
requirements to list on the OSE. Four weeks after the initial meeting with the OSE, there is
a meeting between the accounting rm, the law rm and the OSE. At this time, the formal
application is handed in to the OSE by the investment bank. During the next four weeks,
the investment bank completes the formal listing prospectus. The OSE use this time to go
through the application. The company is then accepted or rejected to list on the OSE. About
80 to 90% of all companies are accepted. Most companies are, however, accepted to list with
5The information about the listing process is obtained from the seminar The road to the listingNovember
3, 2009 by Deloitte Public Accountants and the Oslo Stock Exchange.
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conditions. Most companies have to adjust before they are allowed to list publicly.
There are two very common conditions. The rst common condition is that the equity
level must be increased. Companies must show that they have su¢ cient equity to keep
the company running for at least 12 months after the listing. It is not necessary with a
positive cash ow as long as the company can run on equity for at least 12 months. Many
companies on the OSE are shipping companies with high cash outows around the listing
date and high cash inows at a later point in time. The second common condition is that
one or two members of the board must be replaced with more independent board members.
Many private companies have boards consisting of representatives that are related to the
company in some way. Public companies must have more independent boards. When a
company is accepted or accepted with conditions, the investment bank starts the roadshow
(the marketing and sale of new stock). This is the main reason why a private company needs
to use an investment bank. Distribution of shares is potentially hard to accomplish without
the sales force of the bank. The company has 45 days to list after it has been accepted or
accepted with conditions. If the company is not listed in this period, the process must be
repeated. Most of the companies that list on the OSE are forced to issue equity as a part of
the listing process, and out of the 403 listings at the OSE in the period 1993 to 2007 only
90 companies can list without increasing their equity level in some way. See Figure 1 for the
timeline in the listing process.
3.2 Public or private sale
Due to oversubscription and share rationing it is di¢ cult for investors to buy large blocks
of shares in most IPOs. In the traditional public o¤ering setting, investors submit bids for a
given number of shares at a specied o¤er price (book-building). (In a xed price o¤ering, the
11
investment bank determine the price rst and then investors submit bids for a given numbers
of shares at the given price). It is common that IPOs are oversubscribed, which means
that there are bids for more shares than the company is planning to sell. The investment
bank usually set the o¤er price where demand is above supply. Sometimes demand is many
times greater than the supply of shares (this is the oversubscription fraction reported in
the newspapers after the o¤ering). Shares are then rationed to the applicants at the price
decided. An investor that bid for a very high number of shares with a very high bid price is
likely to only be awarded a fraction of the applied for shares. The price is likely to be lower
than the bid price because there is only one o¤er price to all investors. This means that the
investor is likely to not be allocated the applied for block of shares even if the investors is
willing to pay a higher price. Investment banks sell all shares in one o¤ering at one price.
Shares are then rationed to all investors willing to pay this price.
In a negotiated private placement, shares are sold in blocks. The investor that is willing
to pay the most for a block of shares is awarded that block. This means that negotiated
private placements are more suitable to transfer blocks of shares. It is easier for an investors
to obtain company blocks (control) following private placements. A company that wants to
sell company control should therefore issue shares in a private placement. It is possible to
stage the equity sales by rst selling blocks and then selling the remaining shares. This is
also what we see in the data. Many companies that use private placements also sell shares
publicly afterwards. Interestingly, this is the opposite order of what is predicted by Zingales
(1995).6
6Zingales (1995) predicts that companies with high private benets of control will sell shares in a public
o¤ering rst. Remaining shares will be sold in a private placement at a later stage. We observe that the
private placement takes place before the public o¤ering every time this two stage process is used. This is
12
4. Theoretical predictions and testable implications
The value of owning shares in a company can come from two sources. The rst is the
residual claim to cash (cash ow rights). When all debtholders and other claimants to com-
pany cash ow has been paid, the remaining cash is the property of shareholders. The other
source of share value is from the ability to control the rm (control value). An owner with
a high ownership percentage can inuence more control and dilute corporate resources away
from smaller owners. This is private benet of control that comes from owning a big stake
in a company. The private benet of control only goes to the controlling owner(s). Private
benet of control is enjoyed by the single biggest owner, or a group that together makes a con-
trolling stake, at the expense of other shareholders (Zwiebel, 1995). Zwiebel (1995) explains
that smaller block holders can join together and get control if desired. Transfer of control
is therefore not necessarily from one big shareholder to another big shareholder. Transfer of
control can also be from one big shareholder to a small group of block shareholders. Value
of control can come from inuencing how a company is run, but it can also come from the
ability to misuse corporate resources. In some companies it is likely that it is easier to use
control to move resources than in other companies. In some companies the private benets
of control are higher because it is easier to dilute corporate funds.7
According to Zingales (1995) the seller of a company can maximize proceed from selling
cash ow rights to dispersed shareholders. The seller can maximize proceeds form selling
control rights by directly bargaining with the seller. Zingales (1995) explains that companies
should optimally be sold in a two stage process. Sellers should rst sell a part of the company
opposite of what is predicted by Zingales (1995).
7E.g. It is expected that there are more private benets of controlling a cash rich rm that produces
sports cars than there is in a steel mill (even if the stand alone share value is the same).
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to dispersed shareholders. Then, the control rights should be sold in a direct negotiation.
In our data set there are no companies that follow this two stage strategy, so we can not
test this model directly. We can, however, test if companies with more value from control
rights (higher private benets of control) are more likely to be sold in negotiations (private
placements). A company with a high value of control should be sold in a private placement
because it is easier to transfer control this way.8 The testable prediction from this is that there
should be a relation between private benets of control and the use of private placements.
We label this the private benet of control hypothesis based on Zingales (1995).
4.1 The private benet of control hypothesis
To test the relationship between private benets of control and the use of private place-
ments it is necessary to measure private benet of control. It is not possible to know the
exact level of private benet of control because it is an unobservable variable. It is, however,
possible to observe some sources of private benets of control, and we use these sources as
estimates of the private benet of control for the controlling owners. It is expected that
companies with block ownership before the o¤ering have a higher private value of control,
and companies with a dispersed ownership before the o¤ering have lower private benets of
control. Zwiebel (1995) argue that the main reason why there are block owners is because
of private benets of control from taking advantage of smaller owners. (Observed block
ownership is a strong indicator of private benets of control). Accordingly, there should be
more private benets of control in the company (before the o¤er) when there are more block
8If there are high private benets of controlling a rm, the rm could potentially stay private so that the
owner can continue to enjoy the private benets of control. If owners still want to go public, it can be argued
that it will be better for the seller to sell control rights separately. There are many benets of being publicly
listed. The most notable is access to capital. It is therefore safe to assume that also companies with high
private benets of control benet of being publicly listed.
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owners that own bigger blocks in the company (before the o¤er). Private benets of control
are therefore estimated on the basis of bock ownership before the o¤erings.9 The ownership
fraction of the largest owner is used as one measure of private benet of control.10 The com-
bined ownership fraction of all block holders is used as another measure of private benet of
control.
Other measures that also indicate the level of private benet of control are the tim-
ing of the o¤ering, company industry, dividend payout, family rms, minority power and
CEO/board compositions. In 2006 there was introduced a new law that increased tax on
dividends in Norway. It is expected that this new tax will reduce the level of dividend paid
out after 2006, and private benets of control will increase after 2006 because more money is
left in the rms. It is expected that this new tax rule will increase private benets of control
after 2006. This is tested for by including the a dummy variable (2006 dummy) that takes
the value of one for all companies listed after 2005. Actual dividend paid in the year before
the listing year is also included. It is also expected that rms in certain industries yield
a higher private benet of control. Especially, it is expected that rms in the sports and
communications industry yield a higher benet of control (Zwiebel, 1995). Unfortunately,
9It is likely that tunneling is one of the major sources of private benets of control. In tunneling, the
biggest owner owns a large stake (e.g. 51%) in one rm and 100% of another rm. The biggest owner then
tunnels resources from the rm with 51% ownership to the rm with 100% ownership. Tunneling can for
instance be in the form of selling assets below actual value. Tunneling lets the big owner steal resources from
the shareholders that own the remaining 49% of the shares in the rst company. We are not able to detect
tunneling in the data.
10All variables, unless otherwise specied, are obtained in the VPS ownership database prior to the o¤ering
or in the listing prospectus made before the o¤ering. This means that all independent variables are known and
observed before the private placement/public o¤ering choice is made. The listing prospectus is mainly based
on annual accounting data, so it is reasonably assumed that all information in the prospectus is available
before the public o¤ering/private placement choice is made. Even the level of capital raised should be known
before the public o¤ering/private placement choice is made. Capital raised is in most cases dictated by OSE
as a requirement to list. We argue that there are no simultaneous decisions in our data, and there is no
endogeneity issues in the analysis.
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there are no sports companies and very few communications companies listed in Norway.
This variable is therefore dropped.
It is also expected that family rms have a higher benet of private control than non-
family rms. It can be argued that family rms have already used their benet of control by
placing family members in management positions. Family rms are dened, in this paper,
as rms where members of one family together hold the largest fraction of the company
and more than one member of the family is in the senior management of the rm. It is
expected that minority power is decreasing in private benets of control. It is expected that
the founder is the minority owner in the company. New owners can group together and gain
control. It is therefore expected that minority (founder) power should decrease in the private
benets of control. Minority power is measured by founder position in the companies (E.g.
The founder as the CEO or on the board of directors). The ownership concentration of the
owners besides the single biggest owner is also a measure of minority power. This is measured
by the Herndahl index of the 50 biggest owners besides the single biggest owner. Finally,
it is expected that there are more benets of control in companies where the largest owner
use control in an observable manner. It is expected that in companies where the largest
owner is the CEO or on the board of directors there are more benets of private control.
The dummy variable private placements (0) or public o¤erings (1) is regressed on the private
benet of control measures in a standard probit model. This is to test if companies use
private placements when there are more private benets of control.11
4.2 Alternative explanations
11It is argued that value of control does not require 51% of the shares (Damodaran, 2005). We do not
know how much ownership that is needed to enjoy private benets of control, so the ownership percentage
of the largest owner or the combined block ownership is included in all regressions.
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Private placements have, in the previous literature, been explained with the monitor-
ing (Wruck, 1989), the certication (Hertzel and Smith, 1993), the entrenchment (Barclay
et al.,2007), the undervaluation (Anshuman et al., 2010) and the asymmetric information
(Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005) hypotheses. The monitoring hypothesis is that investors buy
shares in private placements to increase company valuations through increased monitoring
of management. It is likely that companies with high ownership concentration, before the
initial o¤ering, already have more monitoring of management than companies with lower
ownership concentration. Block owners are more likely to monitor management than smaller
owners. Block owners have more incentive to monitor management than smaller owners be-
cause they have more at stake in the companies. The monitoring hypothesis therefore predict
(indirectly) that companies with lower ownership concentration should be more likely to use
private placements. This is the opposite prediction of the private benet of control hypothe-
sis. The monitoring hypothesis is therefore controlled for by testing the relationship between
ownership concentration before the initial o¤ering and the use of private placements.
The certication hypothesis is that informed investors buy shares in private placements to
put their stamp of approval on company valuations. This does not give the same implications
as the private benet of control hypothesis. There is no reason why a company with more
concentrated ownership would need more certication than a company with less concentrated
ownership. It is, however, likely that smaller and younger companies would be more likely
to want certication, as there is less information publicly available for these companies. The
certication hypothesis is therefore controlled for by including the number of employees (size)
and company age in all regressions.
The entrenchment hypothesis is that private placements are used by company manage-
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ment to keep their positions (even if they perform poorly). Entrenchment is a highly unlikely
explanation for the companies in our sample. All companies are eventually listed publicly
and this indicates that these companies are doing very well. It is very unlikely that the com-
panies in our sample have management that consistently need ownership manipulation to
keep their positions. It can also be seen in Table 3 that most of the companies in the sample
have the largest owner as the CEO or on the board of directors. This indicates that these
owners are active and not passive investors that help keep management in their positions.
The entrenchment hypothesis will also not explain why companies with more concentrated
ownership before the initial o¤ering are more likely to use private placements. If private
placements are used by companies with poor management, it is, however, likely that com-
pany results before the o¤ering are negatively related to the use of private placements. The
entrenchment hypothesis is therefore controlled for by including company results before the
o¤ering in all regressions.
The undervaluation hypothesis is that insiders buy shares in private placements when
they perceive the company to be undervalued. In the capital history section in the listing
prospectus (of all the listing companies) there is a clear distinction between employee o¤erings
and private placements. Company insiders buy shares in employee o¤erings and not through
private placements. The level of ownership for all insider investors is also disclosed before
and after the equity o¤erings, so we know that the private placements are not made towards
company insiders. The undervaluation hypothesis is therefore not relevant for our data set
and question.
The asymmetric information hypothesis is that companies with very high information
discrepancies (between company insiders and outsiders) use private placements to reduce
18
the cost of conveying information to investors. It is likely that certain (harder to value)
industries are more likely to have more information asymmetry. Especially, it is expected
that companies in the Information Technology (IT) sector have more information asymmetry
than other companies. It is also expected that younger and smaller companies have more
information asymmetry because less information is publicly available for these companies.
IT, younger and smaller companies should use more private placements if this hypothesis is
true. It is tested if asymmetric information drives the private placement choice by including
a dummy variable for all companies in the IT sector, the company age and the number of
employees in all regressions.
4.3. Other control measures
The reasons why companies issue equity is to have a su¢ cient level of equity and number
of owners before the listing. The OSE requires a minimum of 500 investors to list on the
main list of the OSE (and 100 to list in the small and medium sized list). Therefore, it is
necessary to control that the number of investors prior to the o¤ering and the capital raised
do not decide the method chosen. These variables are therefore included in all regressions.
Carpentier and Suret (2009) show that Canadian rms that use private placements have lower
book to market rations, are in special industries, are nancially distressed or constrained,
are in the development stage and in general raise less capital.
Barclay et al. (2007) show that private placements are made at a discount to certain
investors. Boone and Mulherin (2007) show that market value is related to the use of private
placements. The problem with these variables is that they are observed only after the listing.
Most of these variables are observed the rst time about six months after the initial private
placement/public o¤ering choice has been made. The variables book to market ratio, rst
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day return and market value are observed the rst time on the day of the listing. These
variables are not available for the companies in our sample because they are privately held.
All companies in the sample are also eventually listed on the stock exchange, so there are no
nancially distressed or constrained rms in the sample. (This is, however, controlled for by
including the last annual net result reported in the listing prospectus).
4.4 Private benets of control after the listing
It can be argued that companies with high private benets of control should stay private.
The reason for this is that it is possible that most of the private benets of controlling a rm
are likely to disappear when the company becomes public. Because of this, it is necessary to
test if there are benets of controlling a private placement company after the listing as well.
If control rights are sold in private placements, there must be greater values of control also
after the listings. To test for this it is necessary to regress private benets of control, after
the listing, on the public o¤ering or private placement choice (and a set of control variables).
Private benets of control is an unobservable variable that is estimated by a portfolio
of measures. Most of the measures are very persistent. (E.g. Few companies change the
CEO or board members right after the listing and company specic variables such as age,
number of employees, family rm, result and dividend do not change. These variables are not
suitable as a single measure of private benets of control after the listing. A more suitable
measure of private benet of control is the ownership fraction of the biggest owner(s) after
the listing. If there is a more concentrated ownership also after the listing, it can be argued
that there is persistence in the control. This is tested by regressing the ownership percentage
of the biggest owner(s) one month after the listing on the private placement or public o¤ering
choice (before the o¤ering) and a set of control variables.
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5. Data and descriptive statistics
In total, 403 companies listed publicly on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in the period
January 1993 to September 2007. Table 2 gives the yearly distribution of public o¤erings and
private placements. All companies must list their ownership records in the Norwegian central
depository (VPS) database as a part of the listing procedure. From this database the pre
o¤ering ownership in all listed companies is observed. Accounting variables are collected from
the listing prospectuses. It is assumed that private placements in the six month period before
the listing date are part of the listing procedure, and private placements before this are not
part of the listing procedure. Company ownership at the end of month six prior to the listing
date is the measure of ownership concentration prior to the o¤ering. Most public o¤erings
are in the calendar month before or in the same calendar month as the listing day. Private
placements are spread out over the six months prior to the listing date. In Table 2, it can
be seen that there is a proportionate number of private placements and public o¤erings over
the sample period. There is a slight increase in the number of private placements compared
to public o¤erings in the end of the sample period. It is argued that the reason for this is
an increase in the Norwegian tax rates in 2006 that increases private benets of control from
more retained cash.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
There are 210 public o¤erings and 106 private placements by companies listing on the
OSE in the period 1993 to September 2007.12 For 19 public o¤erings and 6 private placements
12In total, 44 companies used a private placement before a public o¤ering, and 131 companies did not
o¤er shares to new investors in the lead up period to the listing (21 of these companies were spino¤s to
existing shareholders). Private placements are made at di¤erent points in time in the six months period
before the listings. Private placements before this is not included in the sample. The public o¤erings are
usually performed in the month before the listing or in the listing month itself. Some private placements have
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it has not been possible to identify the ownership before the o¤ering from the VPS ownership
database. These companies are removed from the sample.13 A total of 44 companies made a
private placement before the public o¤ering. These companies are regarded as only private
placement companies as they made this o¤ering rst.14 Companies dene the equity o¤ering
to be private or public in the capital history section in the listing prospectuses. Data on all
historical equity o¤erings are provided in the listing prospectuses of the companies. In Table
3, it can be seen that companies that use private placements and public o¤erings are very
similar. Private placement companies also have on average more large owners on the boards,
higher ownership fraction of the largest owner after the listing, more founders on the boards
(or as the CEOs) and are more likely to be family rms before the o¤erings. The average size
of the 88 private placements is $57.3 million (Table 3). This is just below the average size
of the public o¤erings. For private placements, the combined sale of new and existing shares
averaged about 22% of total outstanding shares at the listing date. For public o¤erings
this number is 41%. The main di¤erences are that private placement companies have on
average lower age and fraction of company sold. There are no signicant di¤erences between
companies that use private placements and public o¤erings on total assets, dividends, results,
a follow on o¤ering to the public or to employees of the company. By using follow on o¤erings the minimum
number of investors regulation, set by stock exchanges, has no inuence on the equity o¤ering method chosen.
The remaining 110 listings are results of mergers with an already listed company, cross listings or companies
traded actively at the Norwegian over the counter list (OTC list) before the OSE listing.
13For 27 public o¤erings and 12 private placements it has not been possible to obtain all company specic
information (i.e. listing prospectuses). These companies are therefore removed from the sample.
14When there is both a public and a private sale it is common that the investors in the private placement
sell a small xed percentage of their allocated shares in the public o¤ering. It is likely that the private
placement is made to increase the capital for the company through the issue of new shares. It is also likely
that the public o¤ering is made to increase the number of shareholders. It is common that there is one xed
resell percentage that applies to all investors in the private placement. This percentage is usually very low
(less than 10%). The issuing company have then sold shares with the condition that the investors must sell
some of their allocated shares before the listing. It is likely that this condition is included to meet minimum
spread requirements set by the OSE. The nal sample is 123 public o¤erings and 88 private placements.
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number of owners before the o¤ering, capital raised and number of employees. The nal
sample is 88 companies that used a private placement and 123 companies that used a public
o¤ering. The timeline of the listing process is given in Figure 1.
5.2 Variable description
The dependent variable in most regressions is a dummy variable for public o¤ering (1) and
private placements (0).15 Combined block ownership is the combined ownership fraction of all
investors that owns more than 5% of the company before any o¤ering is made.16 Holding of
largest owner b. o¤er is the holding fraction of the single biggest owner before the o¤ering.
Holding of largest owner a. listing is the holding fraction of the single biggest owner one
month after the listing. Largest owner is the CEO and Largest owner is on the board are
dummy variables that takes the value of one for companies where the largest owner is the
CEO or on the board of the companies. The founder is the CEO and The founder is on the
board are dummy variables that take the value of one if the founder is the CEO or on the
board. Herndahl index is the squared ownership fraction of the sum of the 50 biggest owners
besides the largest owner.17 The 2006 dummy takes the value of one for all companies listed
after 2005. (Dividend / Total Assets) is the total dividend payment made in the year before
the listing year (scaled by total assets). The Family rm dummy takes the value of one for
15All ownership variables are obtained from the VPS database. All other pre listing variables are obtained
from the listing prospectuses that are made in connection with the listings.
16In Norway, all shareholders that own more than 5% of the outstanding shares must be reported in
the listing prospectus. In the remainder of the article we refer to shareholders that own more than 5% of
outstanding shares as block holders.
17In general, it is expected that private benets of control should decrease in minority power. There are,
however, some sample characteristics that may alter this expectation. In many companies there are a small
group of investors that jointly owns a controlling stake in the company together (E.g. a family or a group of
friends). It is expected that all of these investors will enjoy the private benets of control even if one investor
have a slightly larger stake than the others. Zwiebel (1995) also argues that there are private benets of
control from block holders that are not the single biggest owner.
23
family rms. Family rms are identied in the listing prospectuses as rms where members
of one family together hold the largest fraction of the company and more than one member of
the family is in the senior management of the rm. Age of company is the di¤erence between
listing year and the year of incorporation. Number of employees is the number of annual
accumulated full time employees in the issuing company. Capital raised is the total number
of shares sold in the o¤ering times the o¤er price. N. owners before o¤ering is the number of
investors that own shares in the company before the o¤ering. Capital raised and N. owners
before o¤ering are weakly negatively correlated. (Net result / Total Assets) is the last annual
end of year result, scaled by total assets, listed in the listing prospectus. IT dummy takes
the value of one for companies in the Information Technology (IT) sector. Year xed dummy
is included as dummy variables for the di¤erent years in the sample period (1993 to 2007).
6. Empirical Results
The main nding of the paper is that companies with more block ownership, before the
initial o¤erings, are more likely to use private placements instead of public o¤erings as the
initial equity o¤ering method. The companies that used private placements as their initial
equity issuance method also have owners with higher ownership fractions after the listing
than companies that used public o¤erings. There is also a bigger reduction in the ownership
fraction of the biggest owner(s) following public o¤erings than following private placements.
6.1 The private benet of control hypothesis
The dummy dependent variable private placement (0) or public o¤ering (1) is regressed
on the estimated private values of control in a probit regression.18 In Table 4 it can be
18We do not expect there to be any problems with endogeneity in the analysis. All independent variables
are observed in the listing prospectus before the public o¤ering. We assume that these variables are also
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seen that companies that use private placements have a higher combined block ownership
fraction before the o¤erings than other companies. Companies that use private placements
are also more likely to be family rms. There are also more private placements after 2006
when the private benets of control increased in all companies. Companies with more block
ownership use more private placements, and companies with less block ownership use more
public o¤erings. Companies with block holders before a private placement have new block
holders after the o¤ering. These results control for the alternative explanations for private
placements, the level of capital raised and the number of investors that own shares in the
companies before the o¤erings. The results are also robust to the removal savings banks (13).
From Table 5 it can be seen that the exact same results are obtained when the ownership
fraction of the single biggest owner is used instead of the combined ownership of block
shareholders. Companies with one large owner prior to the initial o¤ering are more likely
to use private placements. This show that companies where there is one large owner prior
to the o¤ering and more family ownership are more likely to use private placements than
public o¤erings. Companies that issue equity in periods where there is likely to be more
private benets of controlling rms (after 2006) also issue more in private placements. From
Table 6 it can be seen that the relationship between private benets of control and private
placements is robust to including year xed e¤ects. It is not possible to reject the hypothesis
that private placements are used to transfer private benets of control.
6.2 Alternative explanations
publicly available before the private placements even if these may be up to ve moths before the listing
prospectus is available. We argue that the used independent variables are determined before the private
placement/public o¤ering choice, and any endogeneity due to simultaneity will therefore not be an issue.
The variables in the listing prospectuses are also available in annual (and quarterly) reports. It is reasonably
assumed that investors are able to locate this information before the private o¤ering.
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Private placements have in the previous literature (in addition to the private benet of
control hypothesis) been explained by monitoring, certication, entrenchment, undervalua-
tion and asymmetric information. There is a positive relationship between the use of private
placements and the combined block ownership fraction and the holding fraction of the largest
owner before the o¤ering. This is the opposite nding of what is predicted by the monitor-
ing hypothesis. The monitoring hypothesis is therefore rejected. It is likely that younger
and smaller companies have more need for certication from informed investors than other
companies. There is not a consistent relationship between the use of private placements
and company age and number of employees. The certication hypothesis is therefore also
rejected. It is expected that there will be a negative relationship between company results
and the use of private placements if company management use private placements to keep
their control (even if they perform poorly). There is, however, not a consistent relation-
ship between company results before the o¤ering and the use of private placements. The
entrenchment hypothesis is therefore rejected. There is also not more private placements
used by younger and smaller companies in the IT industry. If private placements are used to
reduce the problems associated with information asymmetry, it is expected that there will be
a relationship between companies with more information asymmetry (e.g. smaller, younger
and IT companies) and the use of private placements. This relationship does not exist and
the asymmetric information hypothesis is therefore also rejected.
6.3 Private benets of control after the listing
If control rights are sold in private placements, there should be greater values of control
also after the listing in companies that used private placements. To test for this, it is nec-
essary to regress private benets of control after the listing on the public o¤ering or private
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placement choice (and a set of control variables). Private benets of control is an unobserv-
able variable that is estimated by a portfolio of measures in the previous regressions. In Table
7 the combined block ownership percentage of all block owners one month after the listing is
regressed on the public o¤ering or private placement choice (and the control variables for the
alternative explanations). From Table 7 it can be seen that block owners have a signicantly
larger ownership percentage one month after the listing following private placements than
following public o¤erings. Public o¤erings are related to smaller block ownership one month
after the listing. In Table 8 it can be seen that the same results are found when only the
ownership of the single largest owner is studied separately.
In Table 9 the reduction in the ownership percentage of the largest owner(s) is regressed
on the private placement or public o¤ering dummy and a set of control variables. The
reduction of the largest owner is calculated as the change in the ownership percentage of the
single largest owner from six months prior to the listing to one month after the listing. This
is the largest owner in the company. This is not the same owner over time. Table 9 show
that the reduction in ownership percentage of the controlling owner(s) are signicantly larger
in public o¤erings than in private placements. Private placements are related to continued
large owners after the listings. Public o¤erings are related to a reduction in the ownership
percentage of the controlling owners. Table 9 show that public o¤erings are used to reduce
the ownership block of the biggest investors. Private placements are used to keep controlling
owners. It is not possible to detect a reduction in the ability to enjoy private benets of
control after new listings following private placements. It is, however, possible to detect a




There is a strong and robust relationship between company block ownership, before the
initial equity o¤ering, and the use of private placements. The ownership fraction of the
biggest owner(s) before the o¤ering is important for the choice between private placements
and public o¤erings. The biggest owners also have a higher ownership fraction following
private placements than following public o¤erings. If it is assumed that the main reason that
investors are willing to hold blocks of shares is to enjoy private benets of control (either
for the single biggest owner to enjoy private benets of control alone or from block owners
that come together to get control), it can be concluded that private placements are used to
transfer private benets of control. Zwiebel (1995) argue that the only reason investors hold
blocks of shares is to enjoy private benets of control. It is rejected that private placements
are used because of monitoring, certication, entrenchment, undervaluation or asymmetric
information considerations. It is concluded that private placements are used to transfer
private benets of control between the buyer and the seller.
The main theoretical implication of this nding is that Zingales (1995) is correct in that
company control rights are better sold separately. Companies are sold based on the value of
control rights when they are higher than the stand alone cash ow rights. The nding also
have implications for auction theory. When the auction makes it hard to obtain blocks of
shares, as in the case of the IPO, the negotiation may be preferred by the seller if there are
private benets of control. An IPO is not exactly the same as an auction and a private place-
ment is not exactly the same as a negotiations in all senses, but there are large similarities. If
the auction is designed in a way that makes it hard to buy blocks and the value of a block is
higher than the sum of the cash ow value of the shares from private benets of control, the
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seller will prefer a private negotiation to a public auction. The main practical implication of
this nding is that companies should use private placements when the value of control rights
are higher than stand alone cash ow rights. If there are large values of controlling a rm,
the rm should be sold in a private placement.
There are some limitations to the study. Private benet of control is an unobservable
variable that can come from an unlimited number of sources. Private benet of control
is estimated based on existing ownership and company specic variables. A more directly
observable measure of private benet of control would have been preferable. It is also not
possible to detect tunnelling in the data. Tunnelling is likely to be a major source of private
benet of control.
For future research it would be interesting to study a bigger sample that includes more
rms with obvious private benets of control such as sports companies. It would also be very
interesting to study cross company ownership and related business deals. Business deals by
companies with the same ownership would allow us to study tunneling.
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Table 1 Related Studies
Auction (theory)
Bulow and Klemperer (1996) Seller prefer to sell in an auction
Bulow and Klemperer (2009) Buyers prefer to buy in negotiation
and sellers prefer to sell in an auction.
French and McCormick (1984) Auctions are usually preferred
Equity o¤erings (theory)
Zingales (1995) Control rights are optimally sold private
Zingales (1994) Private benets of control is dilution
of minority property rights
Zwiebel (1995) There are benets of blocks smaller than control
Stoughton and Zechner (1998) Private placements increase monitoring
Attract certain types of investors (empirical)
Wruck (1989) Monitoring hypothesis
Hertzel and Smith (1993) Certication hypotheses
Barclay et al. (2007) Entrenchment hypothesis
Anshuman et al. (2010) Undervaluation hypothesis
Brennan and Franks (1997) Underpricing used to
avoid block holder formations
Aru¼gaslan, Cook and Kieschnick (2004) Monitoring not important
Wu (2003) Monitoring not important
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) Private placements reduce
moral hazard and adverse selection
Boone and Mulherin (2007) Auctions does not increase revenue
for the seller




IPOs and Private Placements on the Oslo Stock Exchange
This table gives the annual distribution of initial o¤erings: Column 1 is the sample years. Column 2 is
the number of public o¤erings per year. Column 3 is the average underpricing of the public o¤erings per year.
Column 4 is the total capital raised in all public o¤erings combined per year in USD. Column 5 is the number of
private placements per year. Column 6 is the average underpricing of the private placements per year. Column
7 is the total capital raised in all private placements combined per year in USD. Underpricing is calculated as:
(o¤er price in the listing prospectus  rst day closing price) / o¤er price in the listing prospectus. Value of
shares sold is reported in USD using a USD/NOK exchange rate of 0.1792. The sample period is January 1993
through September 2007.
Public O¤erings Private Placements
Distribution Capital raised Distribution Capital raised
Year N Underpricing % M USD N Underpricing % M USD
1993 5 -1.8% $474 4 27.4% $81
1994 10 4.2% $609 2 4.8% $20
1995 6 6.7% $467 5 8.1% $49
1996 4 24% $99 5 10.6% $49
1997 15 16.6% $972 11 34.6% $139
1998 8 1.9% $185 6 -6.1% $108
1999 4 18.7% $185 0 0 0
2000 9 -0.9% $517 6 36% $527
2001 4 -7.4% $183 2 6.5% $483
2002 2 -9.8% $70 1 2.5% $210
2003 2 -2.3% $83 0 0 0
2004 13 5.6% $1,602 1 5.5% $3.6
2005 20 3.3% $1,709 18 6.6% $1,711
2006 12 3.2% $1,417 9 9.2% $584
2007 9 3.3% $793 18 6.9% $1,077
Total 123 5.3% $9,365 88 12.7% $5,074
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Table 3
Summary Statistics on Firms Going Public
This table show the di¤erence between companies using initial private placements and initial public o¤erings.
"Combined block ownership" is the combined ownership of all investors that owns more than 5% of the company
before the o¤ering. "Holding of largest owner b. o¤er" is the holding fraction of the single biggest owner before
the o¤ering "Holding % of largest owner a. listing" is the holding fraction of the single biggest owner one month
after the listing. "Reduced % of largest owner" is the di¤erence in the ownership fraction of the largest owner
from before the o¤ering to one month after the listing. "Largest owner is the CEO dummy", "Largest owner is on
the board dummy", "The founder is the CEO dummy" and "The founder is on the board dummy" are dummy
variables that take the value of one if the biggest owner or founder are the CEO or on the board. Herndahl
index is the sum of the squared ownership fraction of the 50 biggest owners besides the largest owner. "Age of
company" and "Number of employees" is the age and the number of employees of the issuing company. "2006
dummy" and "Family rm dummy" takes the value of one for issues after 2006 and family rms respectively.
"Capital raised " is the o¤er price times the number of shares sold in the o¤ering. "N. owners before o¤ering"
and "First day return %" are the number of owners in the company before the o¤ering and the rst day return
from o¤er price to rst day closing price respectively. "Market value" is the number of outstanding shares
at the listing day times the rst day closing price. "Fraction of company sold" is the fraction of sold shares
to outstanding shares in the o¤ering. "Net result", "Dividends" and "Total assets" are the last annual result,
dividend paid and total assets reported in the listing prospectus before the o¤ering. The t statistic is calculated
as: (Mean private placements - mean public o¤erings) / (square root [ (variance private placements / numbers
of private placements) + (variance public o¤erings/ numbers of public o¤erings)].
Private placement Public o¤ering Di¤erence
Variables Obs. Mean Std.Dev Obs. Mean Std.Dev Di¤. t-stat.
Combined block ownership 88 0.78 0.23 123 0.76 0.26 0.02 (0.6)
-with no savings banks 88 0.78 0.23 110 0.74 0.26 0.04 (1.1)
Holding largest owner b. o¤er 88 0.5 0.31 123 0.5 0.34 -0.01 (-0.2)
-with no savings banks 88 0.5 0.31 110 0.47 0.32 0.02 (0.7)
Holding largest owner a. listing 85 0.3 0.16 123 0.26 0.18 0.04 (1.7)
Reduced % of largest owner 85 0.2 0.23 123 0.25 0.32 -0.05 (-1.3)
Largest owner is the CEO D 88 0.24 0.43 123 0.16 0.37 0.08 (1.4)
Largest owner is on the board D 88 0.52 0.5 123 0.31 0.46 0.21 (3.1)
Herndahl index 88 0.05 0.05 123 0.04 0.05 0.01 (1.4)
The founder is the CEO D 88 0.27 0.45 123 0.18 0.38 0.09 (1.5)
The founder is on the board D 88 0.36 0.48 123 0.23 0.42 0.13 (2.0)
Age of company in years 88 19.5 28.4 123 36.2 47 -16.7 (-3.2)
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Table 3 continued. Private placement Public o¤ering Di¤erence
Variables Obs. Mean Std.Dev Obs. Mean Std.Dev Di¤. t-stat.
Number of employees 88 507 1,343 123 735 2,220 -228 (-0.9)
2006 dummy 88 0.31 0.46 123 0.17 0.38 0.14 (2.3)
Family rm dummy 88 0.27 0.45 123 0.12 0.32 0.15 (2.7)
IT dummy 88 0.15 0.36 123 0.2 0.4 -0.05 (-0.9)
Capital raised (Mill USD) 88 57.3 93.1 123 75.1 121 -17.8 (-1.2)
N. owners before o¤ering 88 233 654 123 135 265 98 (1.3)
First day return 88 0.13 0.334 123 0.05 0.14 0.08 (2.0)
Market value E. (Mill USD) 88 351.8 525.2 123 236.6 418.7 115.2 (1.7)
Fraction of company sold 88 0.22 0.24 123 0.41 0.26 -0.19 (-5.5)
Net result (Mill USD) 88 5.6 74.5 123 4.2 30.8 1.4 (0.2)
Dividends (Mill USD) 88 0.31 0.96 123 1.4 9.3 -1.1 (-1.3)
Total assets (Mill USD) 88 912 4,926 123 408 968 504 (0.9)
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Table 4
Private Placements and Private Benets of Control of Block Owners
This table reports the coe¢ cients and t -statistics in parentheses for the regressions with the dummy variable
that takes the value of one for IPOs and zero for private placements as the dependent variable. All regressions are
standard Probit models. The sample period is September 1993 to January 2007. All variables are as described
in Table 3. Age, employees, capital raised and number of owners are in log in all regressions. In all Regressions
the combined block ownership fraction of all investors with a holding percentage above 5% before the (rst)
o¤ering are included. In Regression 1 and 2 savings banks (13) are dropped. Regression 2 includes White (1980)
robust standard errors. In regression 3 all savings banks (13) are included. No independent variables have a
correlation above 0.5.
Dummy IPO (1) or Private Placement (0)
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3
Intercept -3.7758 -3.7758 -3.1326
(-2.3) (-2.2) (-1.9)
Combined block ownership fraction -2.0244 -2.0244 -2.0456
(-2.8) (-2.8) (-2.8)
Largest owner is the CEO dummy 0.2298 0.2298 0.1654
(0.8) (0.8) (0.6)
Largest owner is on the board dummy -0.2156 -0.2156 -0.2618
(-0.9) (-0.9) (-1.1)
Herndahl index 1.515 1.515 0.4645
(0.8) (0.8) (0.2)
The founder is the CEO dummy -0.3396 -0.3396 -0.348
(-1.1) (-1.1) (-1.2)
The founder is on the board dummy 0.2199 0.2199 0.1652
(0.8) (0.8) (0.6)
Age of company 0.1298 0.1298 0.2004
(1.6) (1.4) (2.6)
Number of employees 0.0945 0.0945 0.072
(1.7) (1.6) (1.4)
2006 dummy -0.4829 -0.4829 -0.4951
(-2.0) (-2.0) (-2.1)
Family rm dummy -0.5202 -0.5202 -0.5425
(-1.8) (-1.9) (-1.9)
Capital raised 0.2786 0.2786 0.256
(3.4) (3.3) (3.2)
N. Owners before the o¤ering -0.1256 -0.1256 -0.1521
(-1.7) (-1.7) (-2.1)
Net result / Total Assets 0.3123 0.3124 0.2913
(1.2) (1.6) (1.1)
Dividend / Total Assets 4.5216 4.5216 3.4597
(0.8) (0.9) (0.7)
IT dummy 0.4253 0.4253 0.4199
(1.5) (1.6) (1.4)
Observations 198 198 211
Pseudo R -squared 16.4% 16.4% 17.6%
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Table 5
Private Placements and Private Benets of Control of the Single Biggest Owner
This table reports the coe¢ cients and t -statistics in parentheses for the regressions with the dummy variable
that takes the value of one for IPOs and zero for private placements as the dependent variable. All regressions are
standard Probit models. The sample period is September 1993 to January 2007. All variables are as described
in Table 3. Age, employees, capital raised and number of owners are in log in all regressions. In all Regressions
the ownership fraction of the single biggest owner before the (rst) o¤ering is included. In Regression 1 and 2
savings banks (13) are dropped. Regression 2 includes White (1980) robust standard errors. In regression 3 all
savings banks (13) are included. No independent variables have a correlation above 0.5.
Dummy IPO (1) or Private Placement (0)
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3
Intercept -4.6415 -4.6415 -4.0439
(-2.9) (-2.8) (-2.6)
Holding fraction of largest owner before o¤ering -1.5283 -1.5283 -1.5313
(-2.5) (-2.4) (-2.6)
Largest owner is the CEO dummy 0.2489 0.2489 0.1852
(0.9) (0.9) (0.6)
Largest owner is on the board dummy -0.257 -0.257 -0.303
(-1.0) (-1.0) (-1.2)
Herndahl index -3.9762 -3.9762 -5.0464
(-1.6) (-1.5) (-2.1)
The founder is the CEO dummy -0.3744 -0.3744 -0.3821
(-1.3) (-1.3) (-1.3)
The founder is on the board dummy 0.2393 0.2393 0.1855
(0.9) (0.9) (0.7)
Age of company 0.1346 0.1346 0.203
(1.6) (1.4) (2.6)
Number of employees 0.077 0.077 0.0556
(1.4) (1.3) (1.0)
2006 dummy -0.5095 -0.5095 -0.5206
(-2.1) (-2.2) (-2.2)
Family rm dummy -0.4829 -0.4829 -0.5055
(-1.7) (-1.8) (-1.8)
Capital raised 0.2998 0.2998 0.2789
(3.6) (3.4) (3.4)
N. Owners before the o¤ering -0.1183 -0.1183 -0.145
(-1.6) (-1.6) (-2.0)
Net result / Total Assets 0.3284 0.3284 0.3076
(1.2) (1.7) (1.1)
Dividend / Total Assets 3.9909 3.9909 3.0634
(0.8) (0.8) (0.6)
IT dummy 0.421 0.421 0.4179
(1.5) (1.6) (1.5)
Observations 198 198 211
Pseudo R -squared 15.8% 15.8% 16.9%
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Table 6
Private Placement and Private Benets of Control - Year Fixed E¤ects
This table reports the coe¢ cients and standard t -statistics in parentheses for the regressions with the
dummy variable that takes the value of one for IPOs and zero for private placements as the dependent variable.
All regressions are standard Probit models. The sample period is September 1993 to January 2007. All variables
are as described in Table 3. Regression 1 and 3 includes year xed e¤ects and the combined block ownership
fraction before the o¤ering. Regression 2 and 4 includes year xed e¤ects and the holding fraction of the single
largest owner before the o¤ering. In regression 3 and 4 all savings banks (13) are included. No independent
variables have a correlation above 0.5.
Dummy IPO (1) or Private Placement (0)
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
Intercept -4.3351 -5.2256 -3.6263 -4.5002
(-2.2) (-2.8) (-1.9) (-2.5)
Combined block ownership fraction -1.9282 -1.8672
(-2.5) (-2.4)
Holding fraction of largest owner before o¤ering -1.5167 -1.4764
(-2.4) (-2.3)
Largest owner is the CEO dummy 0.1811 0.204 0.1156 0.1377
(0.6) (0.6) (0.4) (0.4)
Largest owner is on the board dummy -0.3166 -0.3572 -0.3425 -0.3803
(-1.1) (-1.3) (-1.2) (-1.4)
Herndahl index 2.9923 -2.3186 1.305 -3.8551
(1.4) (-0.9) (0.6) (-1.5)
The founder is the CEO dummy -0.3931 -0.4329 -0.387 -0.425
(-1.2) (-1.3) (-1.2) (-1.3)
The founder is on the board dummy 0.2501 0.2547 0.1538 0.1625
(0.8) (0.8) (0.5) (0.5)
Age of company 0.1224 0.1342 0.2132 0.2212
(1.4) (1.5) (2.6) (2.6)
Number of employees 0.0924 0.0727 0.0597 0.0419
(1.6) (1.2) (1.0) (0.7)
2006 dummy -0.29 -0.1931 -0.3488 -0.2583
(-0.5) (-0.4) (-0.6) (-0.5)
Family rm dummy -0.4996 -0.463 -0.5252 -0.4857
(-1.6) (-1.5) (-1.7) (-1.6)
Capital raised 0.3048 0.3271 0.2801 0.303
(3.3) (3.4) (3.2) (3.3)
N. Owners before the o¤ering -0.1051 -0.1027 -0.1416 -0.1416
(-1.3) (-1.3) (-1.8) (-1.8)
Net result / Total Assets 0.3574 0.3762 0.3003 0.3239
(1.2) (1.3) (1.1) (1.2)
Dividend / Total Assets 4.7078 3.4868 3.5196 2.4382
(0.8) (0.6) (0.6) (0.4)
IT dummy 0.4174 0.3761 0.3965 0.3652
(1.3) (1.1) (1.2) (1.1)
Year xed dummy yes yes yes yes
Observations 193 193 205 205
Pseudo R -squared 21.9% 21.6% 22.1% 21.9%
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Table 7
Block Owners own more of the Company Following Private Placements
This table reports the coe¢ cients and heteroscedastic consistent t -statistics (errors adjusted for clustering
across rms Rogers, 1993) in parentheses for the regressions with the combined ownership percentage of the
biggest owners one month after the listing as the dependent variable. All regressions are standard OLS models.
The sample period is September 1993 to January 2007. All variables are as described in Table 3. Regression 1
drops savings banks (13). Regression 2 includes savings banks (13). No independent variables have a correlation
above 0.5.
.
Combined block ownership % after the listing
Reg 1 Reg 2
Intercept 71.1734 67.771
(2.9) (3.2)
Dummy IPO (1) or Private Placement (0) -4.5329 -8.4463
(-2.0) (-3.3)
Age of company 2.3088 0.2019
(2.5) (0.2)
Number of employees 0.435 1.4037
(0.7) (1.7)
Capital raised -0.4381 -0.365
(-0.4) (-0.3)
N. Owners before the o¤ering -1.6963 -0.5708
(-2.7) (-1.0)
Net result / Total Assets -2.1682 -1.1675
(-1.3) (-0.5)
IT dummy -1.1653 -1.003
(-0.3) (-0.3)
Year xed dummy yes yes
Observations 195 208
Adjusted R -squared 11.1% 8.1%
40
Table 8
The Biggest Owner have a Larger Ownership % Following Private Placements
This table reports the coe¢ cients and heteroscedastic consistent t -statistics (errors adjusted for clustering
across rms Rogers, 1993) in parentheses for the regressions with the ownership percentage of the biggest owner
one month after the listing as the dependent variable. All regressions are standard OLS models. The sample
period is September 1993 to January 2007. All variables are as described in Table 3. Regression 1 drops the
savings banks (13). Regression 2 includes the savings banks (13). No independent variables have a correlation
above 0.5.
.
Ownership % of the biggest owner after the listing
Reg 1 Reg 2
Intercept 10.7614 6.9755
(0.5) (0.3)
Dummy IPO (1) or Private Placement (0) -3.4035 -6.3423
(-1.8) (-3.1)
Age of company 2.9051 1.3201
(2.5) (1.1)
Number of employees 0.0852 0.8391
(0.2) (1.5)
Capital raised 0.9532 1.0741
(0.8) (1.0)
N. Owners before the o¤ering -1.9657 -1.1421
(-2.6) (-1.6)
Net result / Total Assets 0.7173 1.4292
(0.3) (0.7)
IT dummy -6.1962 -5.6924
(-2.3) (-2.2)
Year xed dummy yes yes
Observations 195 208
Adjusted R -squared 15.7% 9.7%
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Table 9
Reduction in Controlling Ownership from the O¤ering
This table reports the coe¢ cients and White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent t -statistics in parentheses
for the regressions with the change in the ownership percentage of the combined block owners and the biggest
owner from before the o¤ering to one month after the listing as the dependent variable. The regressions are
standard OLS models. The sample period is September 1993 to January 2007. All variables are as described in
Table 3. The sample size is 247 because only ownership variables are used and this reduces the number of missing
observations. Regression 1 and 2 use the Reduced % of block ownersas the dependent variable. Regression 3
and 4 use the Reduced % of the largest owner as the dependent variable. Regression 2 and 4 drop all control
variables. No independent variables have a correlation above 0.5.
Reduced % of block owners Reduced % of largest owner
Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4
Intercept -51.3017 -51.4948 46.6942 19.1943
(-11.0) (-28.4) (10.4) (8.0)
Dummy IPO (1) or Private Placement (0) 7.3362 7.2658 4.8388 6.1761
(3.0) (2.9) (2.0) (1.8)
Capital raised -0.1724 0.1148
(-0.8) (0.6)
N. owners before o¤ering 0.8594 -9.2535
(1.3) (-13.6)
Observations 247 247 247 247
Adjusted R -squared 3.3% 2.7% 51% 0.7%
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Figure 1
Timeline of the Listings on the Oslo Stock Exchange
Listing in database is when the company list ownership records in the ownership database. This is when
the ownership records are observed in the data the rst time. Public O¤ering or Private Placement is when
the companies distribute the allocated shares in the ownership database. The private placement can be at any
point in time in the six month period leading up to the listing. The public o¤ering is in most cases in the month
before or the month of the listing.
Timeline of the listing Private Placements Public O¤erings
Listing in database Listing in database
Six months before the listing
Meeting with the OSE Meeting with the OSE
Compliance report Compliance report
Due diligence Due diligence
Application submitted Application submitted
Prospectus is made Prospectus is made
Private Placement
One month before the listing
(Public O¤ering) Public O¤ering
(Employee o¤ering) (Employee o¤ering)
Listing month Listing Listing
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